急死了！！英文好的请进来。帮帮忙啊
老师叫我用英文写一篇关于美国的ECA，官方出口信用保险机构(ECA,Export Credit Agency)，这个直接影响我的学分的，请大家帮帮我啊。多谢了
用下面的做参考吧。
Export credit agencies, known in trade finance as ECAs, are private or quasi-governmental institutions that act as intermediaries between national governments and exporters to issue export financing. The financing can take the form of credits (financial support) or credit insurance and guarantees (pure cover) or both, depending on the mandate the ECA has been given by its government. ECAs can also offer credit or cover on their own account. This does not differ from normal banking activities. Some agencies are government-sponsored, others private, and others a bit of both.
ECAs currently finance or underwrite about $430 billion of business activity abroad - about $55 billion of which goes towards project finance in developing countries - and provide $14 billion of insurance for new foreign direct investment, dwarfing all other official sources combined (such as the World Bank and Regional Development Banks, bilateral and multilateral aid, etc.). As a result of the claims against developing countries that have resulted from ECA transactions, ECAs hold over 25% of these developing countries' US$2.2 trillion debt. These data are unreliable in the absence of source, definition, or date.
Officially supported export credits
Credits may be short term (up to two years), medium term (two to five years) or long term (five to ten years). They are usually supplier's credits, extended to the exporter, but they may be buyer's credits, extended to the importer. The risk on these credits, as well as on guarantees and insurance, is borne by the sponsoring government. ECAs limit this risk by being "closed" on risky countries, meaning that they do not accept any risk on these countries. In addition, a committee of government and ECA officials will review large and otherwise riskier than normal transactions.
Tied aid credits
Officially supported export credit may be connected to official development assistance (ODA) in two ways. First, they may be mixed with ODA, while still financing the same project (mixed credit). As the export credit is tied to purchases in the issuing country, the whole package qualifies as a tied aid credit, even if the ODA part is untied aid. Second, tied aid credits are not very different from export credits, except in interest, grace period (the time when there is no repayment of the principal) and terms of repayment. Such credits are separated from export credit by an OECD requirement that they have a minimum degree of "softness". "Softness" is measured by a formula that compares the present value of the credit with the present value of the same amount at standardized "commercial" terms. This difference is expressed as a percentage of the credit and called "concessionality level". Thus a grant has a concessionality level of 100%, a commercial credit scores zero per cent. The higher the concessionality level, the more the tied aid credit looks like ODA, the lower, the more it looks like an export credit.
Partially untied credits consist of a tied and an untied part. The latter is usually intended to finance "local cost", investment cost to be made in the importing country. This part may also be in a local currency. Partially untied aid is treated us tied aid.
International regulation
Both officially supported export credits and tied aid credit and grants are extended on terms controlled by governments. Therefore, there is a constant temptation to use these financial instruments to subsidize commercial exports in order to win a temporary advantage on an export market or to counterbalance such an action from another government (matching). However, the end result of such action is negative for importing countries (usually developing countries), who are rendered unable to choose the best combination of quality and price but consider financing first. It is also negative for tax payers, who foot the bill. It may only to the benefit of exporters whose government have the deepest pockets and the greatest willingness to subsidize, even though the macro-economic outcome of the subsidy is doubtful. In the past, there have been big, government-sheltered companies that were kept alive to a very large extent by export credits and tied aid credits. To avoid these traps, it was considered useful to standardize export credit conditions and to monitor matching and tied aid credits.
This situation has led first to an informal agreement in 1976 among some OECD countries, known as "The Consensus". This was succeeded in 1978 by a gentlemen's agreement facilitated by the OECD's now defunct Trade Directorate, which established a Working Party on Officially Supported Export Credits. This gentleman's agreement, officially known as the Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits, is known as "The Arrangement". Although negotiations are facilitated by the OECD, not all OECD member countries are participants ad membership is possble for non-OECD countries.
Since 1999, country risk categories have been harmonized by the Arrangement and minimum premium rates have been allocated to the various risk categories. This is intended to ensure that competition takes place via pricing and the quality of the goods exported, and not in terms of how much support a state provides for its exporters. The Arrangement does not extend to exports of agricultural commodities or military equipment. A recent decision at the World Trade Organization (WTO) indicates that the use of officially supported export credits in agriculture is bound by WTO members' commitments with respect to subsidised agricultural exports (see the WTO Appellate Body decision on the Brazil-US cotton case as it relates to the General Sales Manager (GSM) 102 and 103 programs and other US agricultural export credits).
The Berne Union, or officially, the International Union of Credit & Investment Insurers, is an international organisation for the export credit and investment insurance industry. The Berne Union and Prague Club combined have more than 70 member companies spanning the globe.
At EU level, the European Commission, in particular DG Trade, plays a role in the harmonization of Export Credit Agencies and the co-ordination of policy statements and negotiation positions. This is based on council decisions 73/391/EEC and 76/641/EEC. These decisions provide for prior consultations among member states on long term export credits. Member states may ask each other if they are considering to finance a specific transaction with official export credit support. EU members may not subsidize intra-EU export credits.
Polemic on ECAs
Observers argue for and against export credits. Some observers view them as nothing more than export subsidies by a different name. Others argue that export credits may further the burden of debt that poor countries already suffer. The activities of ECAs are considered by some to be a type of welfare for large corporations. ECAs are also criticised for insuring companies against political actions which aim to protect workers' rights, other human rights or the natural environment in the countries where the investment is being made. Advocates of ECAs have assertions of their own, such as the following: export credits allow impoverished importers to purchase needed goods that would otherwise be unaffordable; export credits are components of a broader strategy of trade policies; and government involvement can achieve results that the private sector cannot, such as applying greater pressure on a recalcitrant borrower. These arguments for and against export credits are not new, having been studied at length in academic literature (for a good general discussion, see Baron, David P. The Export-Import Bank: An Economic Analysis. Academic Press. 1983.; or Eaton, Jonathan. “Credit Policy and International Competition.” Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics, ed. Paul Krugman. MIT Press, Cambridge Mass. 1988.). Of course, these arguments also spill over into broader literature and it is certainly important not to confuse the agency that applies the export credits, the ECA, with the actual policy of providing guarantees or direct lending support to facilitate exports. For example, some accuse the Canadian Wheat Board of providing export credits (for a strident representation of this argument, see Goodloe, Carol. “The Canadian Wheat Board: Government Guarantees and Hidden Subsidies?” The Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy, Vol 5 No 2, p 102-122. 2004.).
ECAs are increasingly requiring member countries to undertake anti-corruption due diligence when applying for export credit. This is due to the increased international enforcement of anti-bribery laws.
ECAs play a pivotal role of getting new projects financed so the economy can be turned around from this recession. Most commercial banks are closed for new business and project funding is a scarce resource. The favourable Commercial Interest Reference Rate (CIRR is the reference rate laid down by the OECD for its member states as the minimum interest rate for officially supported financing of exports) is helping to keep your cost of capital down. But even more important is it that ECAs enables start ups to get financing, which again implies that projects are being realized.
The Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank) is the official export credit agency of the United States federal government. It is an independent agency in the Executive branch established by Congress in 1934 for the purposes of financing and insuring foreign purchases of United States goods for customers unable or unwilling to accept credit risk. The mission of the Bank is to create and sustain U.S. jobs by financing sales of U.S. exports to international buyers. The Bank is chartered as a government corporation by the Congress of the United States; it was last Chartered, for a five year term, in 2006 (Senate Bill 3938, which became Public Law 109-438 on 12/20/2006). Its Charter spells out the Bank's authorities and limitations. Among them is the principle that Ex-Im Bank does not compete with private sector lenders, but rather provides financing for transactions that would otherwise not take place because commercial lenders are either unable or unwilling to accept the political or commercial risks inherent in the deal. Its current chairman is James H. Lambright.
Export credit agencies, known in trade finance as ECAs, are private or quasi-governmental institutions that act as intermediaries between national governments and exporters to issue export financing. The financing can take the form of credits (financial support) or credit insurance and guarantees (pure cover) or both, depending on the mandate the ECA has been given by its government. ECAs can also offer credit or cover on their own account. This does not differ from normal banking activities. Some agencies are government-sponsored, others private, and others a bit of both.
ECAs currently finance or underwrite about $430 billion of business activity abroad - about $55 billion of which goes towards project finance in developing countries - and provide $14 billion of insurance for new foreign direct investment, dwarfing all other official sources combined (such as the World Bank and Regional Development Banks, bilateral and multilateral aid, etc.). As a result of the claims against developing countries that have resulted from ECA transactions, ECAs hold over 25% of these developing countries' US$2.2 trillion debt. These data are unreliable in the absence of source, definition, or date.
Officially supported export credits
Credits may be short term (up to two years), medium term (two to five years) or long term (five to ten years). They are usually supplier's credits, extended to the exporter, but they may be buyer's credits, extended to the importer. The risk on these credits, as well as on guarantees and insurance, is borne by the sponsoring government. ECAs limit this risk by being "closed" on risky countries, meaning that they do not accept any risk on these countries. In addition, a committee of government and ECA officials will review large and otherwise riskier than normal transactions.
Tied aid credits
Officially supported export credit may be connected to official development assistance (ODA) in two ways. First, they may be mixed with ODA, while still financing the same project (mixed credit). As the export credit is tied to purchases in the issuing country, the whole package qualifies as a tied aid credit, even if the ODA part is untied aid. Second, tied aid credits are not very different from export credits, except in interest, grace period (the time when there is no repayment of the principal) and terms of repayment. Such credits are separated from export credit by an OECD requirement that they have a minimum degree of "softness". "Softness" is measured by a formula that compares the present value of the credit with the present value of the same amount at standardized "commercial" terms. This difference is expressed as a percentage of the credit and called "concessionality level". Thus a grant has a concessionality level of 100%, a commercial credit scores zero per cent. The higher the concessionality level, the more the tied aid credit looks like ODA, the lower, the more it looks like an export credit.
Partially untied credits consist of a tied and an untied part. The latter is usually intended to finance "local cost", investment cost to be made in the importing country. This part may also be in a local currency. Partially untied aid is treated us tied aid.
International regulation
Both officially supported export credits and tied aid credit and grants are extended on terms controlled by governments. Therefore, there is a constant temptation to use these financial instruments to subsidize commercial exports in order to win a temporary advantage on an export market or to counterbalance such an action from another government (matching). However, the end result of such action is negative for importing countries (usually developing countries), who are rendered unable to choose the best combination of quality and price but consider financing first. It is also negative for tax payers, who foot the bill. It may only to the benefit of exporters whose government have the deepest pockets and the greatest willingness to subsidize, even though the macro-economic outcome of the subsidy is doubtful. In the past, there have been big, government-sheltered companies that were kept alive to a very large extent by export credits and tied aid credits. To avoid these traps, it was considered useful to standardize export credit conditions and to monitor matching and tied aid credits.
This situation has led first to an informal agreement in 1976 among some OECD countries, known as "The Consensus". This was succeeded in 1978 by a gentlemen's agreement facilitated by the OECD's now defunct Trade Directorate, which established a Working Party on Officially Supported Export Credits. This gentleman's agreement, officially known as the Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits, is known as "The Arrangement". Although negotiations are facilitated by the OECD, not all OECD member countries are participants ad membership is possble for non-OECD countries.
Since 1999, country risk categories have been harmonized by the Arrangement and minimum premium rates have been allocated to the various risk categories. This is intended to ensure that competition takes place via pricing and the quality of the goods exported, and not in terms of how much support a state provides for its exporters. The Arrangement does not extend to exports of agricultural commodities or military equipment. A recent decision at the World Trade Organization (WTO) indicates that the use of officially supported export credits in agriculture is bound by WTO members' commitments with respect to subsidised agricultural exports (see the WTO Appellate Body decision on the Brazil-US cotton case as it relates to the General Sales Manager (GSM) 102 and 103 programs and other US agricultural export credits).
The Berne Union, or officially, the International Union of Credit & Investment Insurers, is an international organisation for the export credit and investment insurance industry. The Berne Union and Prague Club combined have more than 70 member companies spanning the globe.
At EU level, the European Commission, in particular DG Trade, plays a role in the harmonization of Export Credit Agencies and the co-ordination of policy statements and negotiation positions. This is based on council decisions 73/391/EEC and 76/641/EEC. These decisions provide for prior consultations among member states on long term export credits. Member states may ask each other if they are considering to finance a specific transaction with official export credit support. EU members may not subsidize intra-EU export credits.
Polemic on ECAs
Observers argue for and against export credits. Some observers view them as nothing more than export subsidies by a different name. Others argue that export credits may further the burden of debt that poor countries already suffer. The activities of ECAs are considered by some to be a type of welfare for large corporations. ECAs are also criticised for insuring companies against political actions which aim to protect workers' rights, other human rights or the natural environment in the countries where the investment is being made. Advocates of ECAs have assertions of their own, such as the following: export credits allow impoverished importers to purchase needed goods that would otherwise be unaffordable; export credits are components of a broader strategy of trade policies; and government involvement can achieve results that the private sector cannot, such as applying greater pressure on a recalcitrant borrower. These arguments for and against export credits are not new, having been studied at length in academic literature (for a good general discussion, see Baron, David P. The Export-Import Bank: An Economic Analysis. Academic Press. 1983.; or Eaton, Jonathan. “Credit Policy and International Competition.” Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics, ed. Paul Krugman. MIT Press, Cambridge Mass. 1988.). Of course, these arguments also spill over into broader literature and it is certainly important not to confuse the agency that applies the export credits, the ECA, with the actual policy of providing guarantees or direct lending support to facilitate exports. For example, some accuse the Canadian Wheat Board of providing export credits (for a strident representation of this argument, see Goodloe, Carol. “The Canadian Wheat Board: Government Guarantees and Hidden Subsidies?” The Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy, Vol 5 No 2, p 102-122. 2004.).
ECAs are increasingly requiring member countries to undertake anti-corruption due diligence when applying for export credit. This is due to the increased international enforcement of anti-bribery laws.
ECAs play a pivotal role of getting new projects financed so the economy can be turned around from this recession. Most commercial banks are closed for new business and project funding is a scarce resource. The favourable Commercial Interest Reference Rate (CIRR is the reference rate laid down by the OECD for its member states as the minimum interest rate for officially supported financing of exports) is helping to keep your cost of capital down. But even more important is it that ECAs enables start ups to get financing, which again implies that projects are being realized.
The Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank) is the official export credit agency of the United States federal government. It is an independent agency in the Executive branch established by Congress in 1934 for the purposes of financing and insuring foreign purchases of United States goods for customers unable or unwilling to accept credit risk. The mission of the Bank is to create and sustain U.S. jobs by financing sales of U.S. exports to international buyers. The Bank is chartered as a government corporation by the Congress of the United States; it was last Chartered, for a five year term, in 2006 (Senate Bill 3938, which became Public Law 109-438 on 12/20/2006). Its Charter spells out the Bank's authorities and limitations. Among them is the principle that Ex-Im Bank does not compete with private sector lenders, but rather provides financing for transactions that would otherwise not take place because commercial lenders are either unable or unwilling to accept the political or commercial risks inherent in the deal. Its current chairman is James H. Lambright.
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第1个回答 2009-10-06
楼主才试用期二级，会有多少分数，可以拿出100分已经是很慷慨了。
建议直接到google 找篇相关的文章来对付对付吧。
建议直接到google 找篇相关的文章来对付对付吧。
第2个回答 2009-10-06
第3个回答 2009-10-06
这么精密浩大工程伤脑筋的问题，怎么才悬赏100点积分啊太小气了吧。俗话都说舍不得孩子套不着狼，你舍不得积分那会有热心人帮你哟，但我知道你是个要面子的人，不回答又不给你面子，你多查询CEA的相关资料，说得那么辛苦怎么着，也得采纳我为最佳答案吧
路过都请进来帮帮我.我现在如果有勇气我就自杀了.
实话说，分手吧~~如果你一下子放不开，就给你个方法，7天，你忍7天，在这7天里千万不要主动去找他，就当没这个人。过了这7天，你就知道在他心里，你到底是什么地位了，到时在做决定吧~~要是你忍不了7天，那我帮不了你了
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我家狗狗得了子宫蓄脓!!!请进来帮一下忙好吗???
子宫病很难治的,实在不行还是做手术吧,找家卫生条件好的正规医院做.
我是不是要完蛋了吗?请问我的眼睛是怎么回事?有医生能来帮帮我吗
自己的身体一定要好好爱护啊，别为了省事儿，到时候后悔就是一辈子的了。建议你去大型医院检查，像是同仁，大家都听过，很放心，或者是华德眼科医院，是最近起来的一家北京最大的眼科专科医院，很正规，还能接受医保，在金台路，因为在我家附近，所以我了解一些。抽空赶紧去医院吧，祝你早日康复。
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