谁能帮我翻译一下这篇英语文章.太难咯.急啊!
Larry Elliott, economics editor
Wednesday March 14, 2007
Guardian Unlimited
In normal times, Wall Street's high-rollers pay scant attention to what's happening to Americans at the other end of the income scale.
The poorer suburbs and the trailer parks barely rate a glance as they speed off to their lavish weekend homes.
Events over the past few weeks have changed all that. Suddenly, Wall Street's Masters of the Universe are intensely interested in the looming crisis in the sub-prime mortgage market - home loans extended to those with low incomes and poor credit ratings.
The fear is that loans extended with reckless abandon to those unable to pay them back are now turning sour en masse and that what threatens to be the biggest wave of foreclosures in the modern era could spell serious trouble not just for the US but for the global economy.
Stock markets are already trembling following the collapse of New Century Financial - one of the major play-ers in the sub-prime market - and the release of data yesterday showing the number of loans in default is steadily rising.
One estimate suggests that one-in-five sub-prime loans written in the past two years is likely to end in fore-closure - around two million in all.
Only recently has the scale of the potential problem started to be recognised. Sub-prime mortgages totalled $600bn last year, accounting for about one-fifth of the US home-loan market. An estimated $1.3 trillion in sub-prime mortgages - equivalent in size to the economy of California - are currently outstanding.
This is no longer a niche market: sub-prime mortgages account for one quarter of new US home loans, re-flecting the difficulty many Americans have in scrambling on the housing ladder in an era when property prices have been rising and wages have been rising sluggishly.
What happened is that a few years ago, when interest rates were low and the US financial sector was awash with cash, lenders were keen to make loans and allowed people to take out mortgages when they were not earning enough to keep up the payments. Often, lenders did not make even the most basic of checks to see whether borrowers had the financial wherewithal to pay back what they owed.
This was a huge and lucrative market for the US financial sector. Some 40% of Americans are classed as sub-prime - essentially not having high enough Fico ratings to be lent to by a Federal Reserve-backed institution. Fico scores are rankings created by Fair Isaac & Co Credit to determine whether customers will repay loans.
Wall Street encouraged this behaviour by bundling loans into securities that were sold to pension funds and hedge funds looking for higher returns.
While house prices were going up, these securities seemed a solid bet.
因为提问有字数限制,所以这只是文章的一小部分.
我也能下个翻译软件来翻译,但是不够准确,所以请真正懂这篇文章的人来帮帮我,如果翻译的好的话我会适当给你追加分的哈!
谢谢咯!
里·埃利奥特， 经济学编辑星期三3月14日，在正常时间无限的2007 监护人， 华尔街的挥金如土的人不够注意正在收入规模的另一个端发生在美国人身上的。 这更糟糕的市郊和那些拖车公园刚刚比率一瞥象他们朝他们的慷慨周末家离开加快的那样。 数周已经改变的在过去的少数的事件所有。 突然， 华尔街的主人 那些宇宙用这附属首要抵押市场对朦胧地出现的危机强烈感兴趣-内部借款给予那些低收入和糟糕信贷等级。 恐惧是对那些的有轻率的放纵的展期贷款不能 为了偿还他们不现在变酸全部和什么威胁是大取消抵押品赎回权在现代内的波能 拼写严重的麻烦不只为美国而是为全球经济。 股票交易市场已经是摇晃的金融继新世纪的崩溃之后 - 一的这附属首要市场这主要戏剧ers-和释放的数据昨天显示这拖欠贷款的数量稳定上升。 一个估计建议用那个5，在过去的两年中写的附属首要贷款结果是前结束很可能-总计大约200万年
只是最近开始被认识到潜在的问题的规模。 附属最好抵押去年总计6，000亿美元，占大约美国家借贷市场的5 分之1。 附属首要抵押估计美元1.3万亿-尺寸到经济的加利福尼亚等效 - 目前杰出。 这不再是一个适当的位置市场： 附属最好抵押解释新美国内部借款的四分之一， 再flecting很多美国人在在住房梯子在房地产价格上升什么时候的一个时代内上争夺方面有和工资一直停滞上升的困难。 所发生的几年以前那个， 利率是低的和美国金融部门由于现金被水覆盖， 出借人热心挣贷款，在他们是时，允许人们取出抵押 不挣得够保持支付。 经常，出借人甚至没做检查的最基本的看看是否借款人有金融必要的资力偿还他们欠的。 这是美国金融部门的一个巨大和有利的市场。 大约40%的美国人分等当时附属最好时期-基本上没有足够高Fico 等级要被借给到以联邦储备机构支持的。 Fico 得分是博览会艾萨克公司信贷创造的等级确定是否用户将付还贷款。 华尔街通过把贷款塞进被出售到养老基金和对冲基金(寻找高盈利)的证券鼓励这行为。 当房子价格上升时，这些证券好像一个固体赌博。
