请懂会计英语的高手帮忙翻译一下。。。。

Question

In this paper we examine whether and how accounting information about a firm manifests in its cost of capital, despite the forces of diversification. We build a model that is consistent with the CAPM and explicitly allows for multiple securities whose cash flows are correlated. We demonstrate that the quality of accounting information can influence the cost of capital, both directly and indirectly. The direct effect occurs because higher quality disclosures reduce the firm’s assessed covariances with other firms’ cash flows, which is non-diversifiable. The indirect effect occurs because higher quality disclosures affect a firm’s real decisions, which likely changes the firm’s ratio of the expected future cash flows to the covariance of these cash flows with the sum of all the cash flows in the market. We show that this effect can go in either direction, but also derive conditions under which an increase in information quality leads to an unambiguous decline the cost of capital.
The link between accounting information and the cost of capital of firms is one of the most fundamental issues in accounting. Standard setters frequently refer to it. For example, Arthur Levitt, the former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, suggests that “high quality accounting standards reduce capital costs.” Similarly, Neel Foster, a former member of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) claims that “More information always equates to less uncertainty, and people pay more for certainty. In the context of financial information, the end result is that better disclosure results in a lower cost of capital.” While these claims have intuitive appeal, there is surprisingly little theoretical work on the hypothesized link.
In particular, it is unclear to what extent accounting information or firm disclosures reduce non-diversifiable risks in economies with multiple securities. Asset pricing models, such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), and portfolio theory emphasize the importance of distinguishing between risks that are diversifiable and those that are not. Thus, the challenge for accounting researchers is to demonstrate whether and how firms’ accounting information manifests in their cost of capital, despite the forces of diversification.
请不要用软件翻译!!!

Answer 1

在本文我们是否尽管多样化力量审查和关于企业的帐户信息怎么体现在它的集资费用。 我们建立与CAPM是一致的和明白地考虑到多证券现金流动被关联的模型。 我们显示出，帐户信息的质量可能影响集资费用，两个直接或间接地。 直接效应发生，因为更加优质的透露减少与其他firms’现金流动的firm’s被估计的协变性，是非diversifiable。 间接效应发生，因为更加优质的透露影响firm’s真正的决定，可能的变化期望的未来现金流动firm’s比率对这些现金流动协变性与所有现金流动的总和的在市场上。 我们表示，这个作用可以在任何一个方向进，而且获得增量进入信息质量带领一种毫不含糊的衰落集资费用的情况。 帐户信息和集资费用的The链接企业的之间是其中一个在会计的最根本的问题。 标准安装员常常地提到它。 例如，亚瑟Levitt， SEC的前主席，建议“high质量会计标准同样减少资本costs.”，养育的Neel，财务会计标准的一名前成员上(FASB)声称“More信息总是视同对较少不确定性，并且人们支付更多把握。 在财政信息中，最终结果是更好的透露导致便宜capital.”，当这些要求有直觉的呼吁时，那里是惊奇地少许在被假设的链接的理论工作。
特别是，它是不明的帐户信息或牢固的透露在何种程度上减少在经济的非diversifiable风险与多证券。 财产定价塑造，例如资本价格模型(CAPM)，并且股份单理论强调区别的重要性在diversifiable不是的风险和那些之间。 因此，会计研究员的挑战是否是展示和firms’帐户信息怎么在他们的集资费用体现，尽管多样化力量